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I 
It is, as is familiar, difficult to be precise about what is involved in realism. The real- 
ist in us wants to hold to a certain sort of very general view about our place in the 
world, a view that, as I have put it elsewhere, mixes modesty with presumption.' 
On the one hand, it is supposed, modestly, that how matters stand in the world, what 
opinions about it are true, is settled independently of whatever germane beliefs are 
held by actual people.2 On the other, we presume to think that we are capable of 
amving at the right concepts with which to capture at least a substantial part of the 
truth, and that our cognitive capacities can and do very often put us in position to 
know the truth, or at least to believe it with ample justification. The unique attraction 
of realism is the nice balance of feasibility and dignity that it offers to our quest for 
knowledge. Greater modesty would mean doubts about the capacity of our cognitive 
procedures to determine what is true-or even about our capacity to conceptualize 
the truth-and, so, would be a slide in the direction of skepticism. Greater presump- 
tion would mean calling into question, one way or another, the autonomy of truth, 
and, so, would be a slide in the direction of idealism. To the extent that we are seri- 
ous about the pursuit of truth, we are unlikely to be attracted by either of these ten- 
dencies. We want the mountain to be climbable, but we also want it to be a real 
mountain, not some sort of reification of aspects of ourselves. 
It is a remarkable phenomenon that an issue of this degree of abstractness, 
whose proper formulation is unclear to the point where it is prima facie hazy what 
shape a relevant debate about it might assume, can so command intellectual curi- 
osity. The conviction that a real issue is being presented is the conviction that 
metaphysics, in the most traditional sense, is possible: that there are genuine ques- 
tions about the objectivity of human intellectual endeavor, and about the constitution 
of reality, which it falls to the traditional philosophical methods of critical reflection 
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and analysis to resolve, if resolution is possible. This conviction may be baseless, 
and may yet be shown to be so by the application of just those methods. But we 
should work very hard before drawing that conclusion. The intellectual satisfaction 
associated with properly formulating and responding to these questions will be far 
greater than that of a repudiation of them, however well motivated. 
In any case, it is evident that progress can be consequent only on some clari- 
fications, perhaps in unexpected directions. One deservedly influential attempt at 
such a clarification has been Michael Dummett’s.’ I shall begin by indicating certain 
causes for dissatisfaction with Dummett’s proposal, and will then try to consider 
what more generally apt analysis of realism may be appropriate if the metaphysical 
issues are to emerge both as reasonably definite in content and as (at least potentially) 
tractable. I am bound to confess to a certain pessimism about the ultimate possibility 
of this project. But my suggestions here must, in any case, be sketchy. And the 
thought is always consoling that, often in philosophy, it is more instructive to travel 
than to get anywhere. 
11 
No one has to be a realist, or not rout court. It is open to us to regard only some 
of our commitments as apt to engage with reality in the appropriate way. Realism 
about theoretical science, for example, need not commit one to realism about pure 
mathematics-and, indeed, one may wish to be only eclectically realist within 
science, taking an antirealist view of quantum theory, for instance. Dummett’s origi- 
nal view was that the distinctive and proper thesis of realism about a particular genre 
of statements is that each of them is determinately either true or false-that the prin- 
ciple of bivalence holds good for them. The point of the proposal is best appreciated 
if we concentrate on a class of statements-say, those concerning the past beyond 
living memory-for whose truth-values we cannot guarantee to be able to get evi- 
dence one way or the other. Holding that bivalence is valid for such statements is 
holding that each is, nevertheless, guaranteed to be true or false. It would appear 
to follow that what confers truth or falsity on such a statement must be something 
separate from and independent of whatever makes for the availability of evidence 
for the statement’s truth-value-if anything does. Hence, in particular, such a state- 
ment’s being true cannot be the same thing as its meeting even our most refined 
criteria for its truth. The truth is, thus, independent of human opinion, which is the 
key realist notion.‘ 
This line of thought has its problems,’ but here I shall assume that it is in good 
order as far as it goes. That, however, does not seem to be far enough. One drawback 
of Dummett’s proposal, remarked by a number of commentators, is that a Dummett- 
ian ‘realist’ about a given class of statements may also be a reductionist about them. 
Someone who held, for instance, that statements about the mental may be exhaus- 
tively analyzed in behavioral terms could also consistently hold that the analysis 
would be bivalence-preserving; anyway, they would have to hold, presumably, that 
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the analysis would respect the lack of any guarantee of available evidence, one way 
or the other, for such statements. But, such a view would hardly involve what we 
think of as realism about the mental. Dummett, it should be emphasized, has never 
been under any illusions about this6 and would be content to add, I think, that realism 
must be a view about what makes for the truth of statements when they are literally 
and nonreductively construed. But a more serious worry concerns vagueness. If the 
members of the germane class of statements are vague, then we precisely do not want 
to hold that each of them is guaranteed to be determinately either true or false. At 
the same time, vague statements are capable of truth and falsity, and a realist concep- 
tion ought to be possible, it seems, of what makes for the state of affairs when they 
do possess determinate truth-values.’ 
One response would be to suggest that, when bivalence is inappropriate for 
this sort of reason, Dummett’s proposal should reduce, in effect, to the claim that 
truth may be evidence-transcendenr: The truth of a statement, vague or otherwise, 
need have no connection with the availability of any ground, even in principle, for 
believing it to be true. I believe that the appropriateness of so construing truth is the 
deep question that Dummett’s writings on the topic raise, and that such a construal 
is, indeed, a cardinal feature of certain realist positions, notably the Cartesian philos- 
ophy of mind, the Platonist philoscjphy of mathematics, and certain forms of scien- 
tific realism. But it leaves the realist with no opinion to hold when it comes to state- 
ments for which evidence, one way or the other, can be guaranteed to be 
available - effectively decidable mathematical statements, for instance, or a statment 
concerning the observable outcome of an experiment. More important still, it 
represents as the distinctive realist thesis something that someone might well want 
to oppose, though still wishing to endorse the spirit of realism. Antirealism, in the 
sense associated with Dummett’s work, is exactly the view that the notion of truth 
cannot intelligibly be evidentially unconstrained-or the view, at least, that once it 
is so unconstrained, it is no longer in terms of rrurh-conditions that the meanings of 
the statements in question can be interpreted. But someone who believes that has, 
so far, no motive to forswear all use of the notion of truth (whatever exactly that 
would involve), unless it is supposed that truth is always and essentially epistemi- 
cally unconstrained-a supposition that falls foul of evident fact that, for a great 
many types of statements, we can make no sense of the idea of their being true if 
we have to suppose that evidence for their truth is not, at least in principle, available. 
Indeed, in contrast to the direction of much of Dummett’s work on this topic, it is 
not clear that a general antirealist semantics must be other than truth-conditional, 
provided the truth of a statement is always taken to require the availability of evi- 
dence for its truth. The point remains that it ought to be possible to take a realist 
view of what makes for the truth or falsity of statements whose truth-values are not 
conceived as evidence-transcendent. Dummett’s antirealist, who wishes to urge that 
truth-value should never be so conceived, seems to have no motive to reject realism 
in this more basic sense. 
But what is the more basic sense? It would pass for a platitude, I think, that 
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whether or not a statement, envisaged as uttered on a particular occasion, would ex- 
press a truth is a function only of the content it would have on that occasion and the 
state of the world in relevant respects. The more basic kind of realism involves, I 
suggest, the assumption of a sort of mechanical view of this Platitude. Truth-values 
are, so to speak, ground out on the interface between language and reality. What 
thought a particular sentence would express in a particular context depends only on 
the semantics of the language and germane features of the context. Whether that 
thought is true depends only on which thought it is and germane features of the 
world. At neither point does human judgment or response come into the picture. To 
be sure, the semantics of the language depends on institution; it is we who built the 
machine. But, once built, it runs by itself. Thus, of any particular statement of 
sufficiently definite sense, it is determinate whether it expresses a truth in any partic- 
ular context, irrespective of any judgment we may make about the matter. A basic 
realist thought is that wherever there is truth, it is, in this way, invesrigarion- 
independent. 
Since this conception builds no epistemic constraints into the factors that deter- 
mine truth, it will no doubt come easily to someone who subscribes to it to suppose 
that truth can transcend all evidence. And since no provision seems to be made 
whereby reality can fail to determine truth-values, so long as the statements con- 
cerned are of sufficiently definite sense, bivalence, too, will be a natural adjunct. But 
the conception is completely general, available both for the class of statements 
whose truth we conceive as requiring the availability of evidence for their truth and 
for its complement. And it does nothing to alter the essential character of this con- 
ception of truth to superimpose whatever verlicationist constraints we please. 
The conception remains very much at the level of metaphor. But at least it is 
clear that realism, as characterized by it, has two quite distinct areas of obligation. 
The belief that a class of statements are apt to possess investigation-independent 
truth-values depends on regarding meaning as strongly objective: What constitutes 
correct use of an expression in particular circumstances has to be thought of as set- 
tled somehow independently of anyone's actual dispositions of response to those cir- 
cumstances. What fits the meaning is one thing; what, if anything, we are inclined 
to say is another; and any correspondence between the two is merely contingent. 
Naturally, one feels there has to be something to this thought, that if the notion of 
meaning, and with it the notions of truth and error, are not to collapse, there must 
be space for some kind of contrast between proper use of an expression and that use 
to which people may actually incline. But it is quite another question whether only 
a realist conception of the objectivity of meaning can avoid such a collapse. 
Wittgenstein' assimilated the relationship between meaning and practice to that be- 
tween character and behavior. The parallel is suggestive: It is quite consistent with 
our attaching sense to the idea of someone's action being out of character to regard 
what it is true to say about character-as we do-as a function of the way the subject 
is actually inclined to behave. But I shall not consider further what notion of the ob- 
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jectivity of meaning may be appropriate to the realist’s purpose.’ My point is merely 
that someone who inclines to the ‘more basic’ realism owes an account of the matter. 
A philosopher who had no qualms about the objectivity of meaning as such, 
however, might still be dissatisfied with this kind of realism about a particular class 
of statements. If there are to be things that it would be correct to say, irrespective 
of what anyone is actually inclined to say, then-in accordance with the Platitude-a 
contribution is called for from ‘the state of the world in relevant respects’. Histori- 
cally, the various forms of antirealism, in different areas of philosophy, have been 
fueled mainly by doubts about the capacity of the world to make the necessary contri- 
bution. One class of such proposals is assbciated with more or less austere, 
empiricism-inspired theories of concept-formation. Hume, for instance, believed 
that there is no way whereby we can form a properly perspicuous notion of causation 
except at the cost of not including all the features that popular thought attributes to 
it. Hence, understood as popularly intended, statements involving the notion of cau- 
sation are of insufficiently definite sense, in the Humean view, to take on determinate 
truth-values. Since they, nevertheless, play a relatively determinate role in our ordi- 
nary thought and language, the proper account must be that their role is not to ‘cor- 
respond to the facts’-we can attain no satisfactory conception of the relevant 
‘facts’- but is a nondescriptive one. The instrumentalism about scientific-theoretical 
statements espoused by many positivists had an essentially similar rationale: A pre- 
ferred theory of meaning-here, the conviction that all significant descriptive lan- 
guage must ultimately be analyzable into a vocabulary of sense experience- 
transpired not to have the resources to accommodate such statements within the sanc- 
tuary of fact-stating respectability. 
This kind of proposal has its primary motivation in the theory of meaning. The 
reality of causation, or of certain sorts of theoretical entities, is called into question 
only because it is doubted that we can form any genuine concepts of what such things 
could be. A second kind of proposal, to similar effect, has a more basic ontological 
motivation. Although it is true that nondescriptive theories of moral and aesthetic 
valuation, for instance, can be and were stimulated by positivistic views about mean- 
ing, they have, nevertheless, retained an attraction for many who find no virtue in 
positivism. Such philosophers simply find it metaphysically incredible, as it were, 
that the world might actually contain objective values to which our moral, aesthetic, 
and other value judgments may be seen as some sort of cognitive response. It is 
thought baffling what kind of thing an objective value could be- in what the objective 
value of a situation could reside-and what part of our nature might justifiably be 
considered sensitive to such a commodity. The alternative to so murky and preten- 
tious a view of, for example, moral language is, again, to account for what appear 
to be its genuine assertions in terms of their possession of some other nondescriptive 
role.” 
There are, no doubt, other kinds of motives for similar tendencies. The general 
conception to which they give rise is that the range and variety of our declarative 
discourse somehow outstrips the categories of states of affairs that are genuinely ex- 
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emplified by reality. We apparently talk as if there were moral, or scientific theoreti- 
cal, or pure mathematical states of affairs, but in truth there are not. One response 
to that conviction, of course, would be to dismiss the ‘language games’ in question 
as mythology. What is common to the forms of antirealism in which we are in- 
terested here is that they eschew that response: What might be taken to be mythologi- 
cal descriptions are credited, instead, with some sort of different but valid role. I 
shall reserve the term irrealism as a marker for these tendencies in general, prefer- 
ring ‘projectivism’ for a proper subclass of irrealist proposals with which we shall 
be concerned later. What opposes irrealism with respect to a particular class of state- 
ments is the view that the world is furnished to pray the part in the determination 
of their truth-values, which the Platitude calls for, that there really are states of 
affairs of the appropriate species. 
I11 
Our concern, then, is with the philosophical topology of irrealism. What precisely 
are the commitments of irrealism concerning a particular class of statements? How 
best might it be supported? Is it ultimately coherent? For a time, during the hegem- 
ony of so-called linguistic philosophy, the irrealist tendency seemed to be channeled 
exclusively into various forms of expressive theory. Expressive theories were pro- 
posed not merely of judgments of value, but of claims about truth and about causa- 
tion, professions of knowledge, descriptions of actions as voluntary, and much 
else. l2 The point of the notion of ‘expression’ here is precisely its contrast with and 
exclusion of assertion, properly so regarded. When one expresses something in this 
sense, the intention was, one makes no claim about reality,13 even though the syntax 
of the utterance is superficially that of a genuine assertion, apt to agree or to fail to 
agree with some putative state of affairs. 
The principal difficulties encountered by these theories were twofold. First, 
many of the positive suggestions concerning what was being expressed, or more 
generally what, in enunciating an ‘expression’, people were doing, were actually quite 
consistent with holding that the relevant kind of sentence effected an assertion. For 
example, those who held that to characterize an action as voluntary was to express 
one’s willingness to hold the subject responsible for the consequences said something 
that no realist about the distinction between voluntary and involuntary action would 
have wanted to deny. Not that this has to be an objection to the expressivist’s positive 
claim. The point is, rather, that if the positive account offered by an expressive theory 
nowhere goes beyond what an opponent would acknowledge as aspects of the ‘prag- 
matics’ of the relevant class of utterances, then the theoretical obligation remains to 
explain why it is that these pragmatic aspects actually exhaust the use of the relevant 
sentences and are not merely consequences of their possession of a genuinely asser- 
toric role. Historically, this obligation has not, by and large, been properly met. 
Second, the syntactic similarities between the sorts of ‘expression’ listed and 
what the theorists would have been content to regard as genuine assertions are actu- 
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ally far from superficial. Sentences, for instance, which, according to emotivism, 
are apt merely for the expression of evaluative attitudes, display all the syntactic pos- 
sibilities enjoyed by, for example, descriptions of the weather. They allow, for in- 
stance, a full range of tenses, appraisal as "true," "false," "exaggerated," "justified," 
and so on; they may feature embedded in the ascription of propositional attitudes; 
and they admit of compounding under the full range of logical operations. In connec- 
tion with the last, Peter GeachI4 argued, in an influential note, that expressive the- 
ories have no resources with which to explain the permissible occurrence of, for ex- 
ample, moral sentences as the antecedents of conditionals. If "Stealing is wrong" 
serves only to express moral disapprobation, how do we construe its role in "If steal- 
ing is wrong, encouraging people to steal is wrong also"? 
Expressivism can give no answer to this question unless it is possible to con- 
strue the antecedent of such a conditional as doing something other than hypothesis- 
ing its truth. Dummett has suggested that it is." Each kind of sentence for which 
expressive theories have been proposed is used to mark the speaker's undertaking 
of a certain sort of commitment. Accordingly, rather than view the conditional just 
as a device for focusing attention on the range of circumstances in which its antece- 
dent is true, we can see it, more generally, as a device for articulating the conse- 
quences of acceptance of the commitment that, if someone were to avow the antece- 
dent on its own, they would undertake. For instance, the effect of the conditional 
at the conclusion of the preceding paragraph would be, roughly: 
If I were (to be brought to) to express a commitment to the wrongness of steal- 
ing, I should also (be willing to?) express a commitment to the wrongness of 
encouraging others to steal.16 
Geach's point, it could be claimed, would hardly be philosophically fundamental, 
in any case. If moral irrealism did, indeed, have absolutely no prospect of a satisfac- 
tory construal of conditionals with moral antecedents, that could hardly be decisive. 
Rather, whatever case there was for moral irrealism would become potentially revi- 
sionary of our ordinary and moral linguistic practice-compare the relation between 
classical mathematics and the philosophical views of the intuitionists. But such radi- 
cal revisionism- in effect, the proscription of all compound moral sentences - is best 
avoided, and Dummett's proposal, though in some respects imprecise, at least indi- 
cates a strategy for avoiding it in the present case. 
The strategy has been taken further by Simon Blackburn" in connection with 
what he styles the general program of quasi-realism. This program comes into play 
by way of supplement to the irrealist (for Blackburn, 'projectivist') view of some 
given class of statements. Quasi-realism's goal is to show how the irrealist account 
of the content of these statements need not be revisionary. It proceeds by attempting 
to supply alternative analyses of what appear, from an irrealist point of view, to be 
problematic modes of construction - conditionals, embeddings within propositional 
attitudes, even the truth predicate itself, and so on-which are to harmonize with 
what the irrealist wants to say about the basic statements in the class in question. In 
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particular, therefore, the quusi-realist constructions have to proceed without any as- 
signment of truth-conditions to these basic statements. 
Actually, there are a number of significant differences between Dummett and 
Blackburn. Dummett’s proposal consisted essentially in calling attention to the 
potential utility of a conditional construction that- unlike the ordinary conditional - 
hypothesize not the truth of its antecedent, but its utterance with a particular recog- 
nized illocutionary force. What is contemplated is a range of conditionals with an- 
tecedents like ”if I were to be brought to ask whether P . . . ”, “if I were to be 
brought to assert that P . . .”, “if I were to command that P . . . ,” and so on. 
The consequents of such conditionals may, then, either describe a further such utter- 
ance or may simply say something about the circumstances that would prevail if the 
speech act characterized in the antecedent were to be performed. This suggests, 
though it is not conclusive, that Dummett was tacitly viewing expressive theories as 
holding ‘expression’ to be an illocutionary operation on a thought, just as are asser- 
tion, wish, question, and command. Undoubtedly, this is one possible view. It 
promises perhaps the tidiest explanation of how ‘expressions’ fail candidacy for 
truth-value-one directly modeled on the corresponding failure of, for instance, an 
indicative sentence used to express a command. Of course, if one attempts to view 
‘expression’ in this way, then there has to be an embedded thought, just as there is 
in the case of the command (namely, the thought whose truth it is commanded should 
be brought about). So, an account will be owing of what are the genuine, truth-value- 
bearing thoughts that are so embedded in, for instance, moral evaluation- a possible 
source of difficulty if the case is an example like “Stealing is wrong,” rather than 
“You were wrong to steal that money.” 
Whether or not this was Dummett’s perception of the matter, Blackburn’s 
seems different. If an apparent assertion is not a genuine assertion, that is, a claim 
that something is true, it may be a different mode of illocution of something apt to 
be true; but it may also be construed as a different kind of speech act altogether, no 
sort of operation on a thought. Blackburn’s reaction to the problem of construing 
moral compounds, and especially conditionals with moral antecedents, is in keeping 
with this second conception. For Dummett, such conditionals emerge as genuine as- 
sertions. Blackbum, in contrast, has it that a conditional such as 
If stealing is wrong, encouraging others to steal is wrong 
is itselfan evaluation; to wit, a positive evaluation of combining a negative evalua- 
tion of stealing with a negative evaluation of encouraging others to steal. 
How do these proposals cope with Geach’s challenge to explain the validity of 
such an inference as 
Stealing is wrong; 
If stealing is wrong, encouraging others to steal is wrong; 
So: encouraging others to steal is wrong? 
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On Dummett’s account, the conditional premise becomes something like: 
If I ever (am brought to) negatively evaluate stealing, then I also (will be will- 
ing to) negatively evaluate encouraging others to steal. 
If that conditional is true, then if I so perform as to realize its antecedent-that is, 
I endorse the first premise-then it follows that I thereby endorse, or at least that 
I will be willing to endorse, the wrongness of encouraging others to steal. So, it looks 
as though, modulo its inexactness, Dummett’s proposal may well have the means to 
validate Geach’s example. One might wonder, though, about whether the inference, 
even if valid as so construed, is properly repreiented by Dummett’s account. The 
gist of the second premise ought to be not a description of a performance that I will 
actually (be ready to) carry out in certain circumstances, but rather, something nor- 
mative: It is that a negative evaluation of stealing ought to be accompanied by a nega- 
tive evaluation of the practice of encouraging others to steal. 
In this respect, Blackburn’s strategy of construing the conditional as itself an 
evaluation seems superior. But what, now, does the validity of the inference consist 
in-when it cannot be that the truth of the premises guarantees that of the conclu- 
sion?’* Anything worth calling the validity of an inference has to reside in the incon- 
sistency of accepting its premises but denying its conclusion. Blackburn does indeed 
speak of the ‘clash of attitudes’ involved in endorsing the premises of the modus po- 
nens example, construed as he construes it, but in failing to endorse the conclusion. 
But nothing worth regarding as inconsistency seems to be involved. Those who do 
that merely fail to have every combination of attitudes of which they themselves ap- 
prove. That is a moral failing, not a logical one.lg 
Generally, there is no difficulty in making out a notion of inconsistency for 
speech-acts other than assertion, provided they represent genuine modes of illocu- 
tionary force, that is, operations on a thought. Commands, for instance, are incon- 
sistent just in case the thoughts are inconsistent whose truth they command be 
brought about; questions are inconsistent just in case the thoughts of whose truth they 
enquire are inconsistent; and so on. Even in these cases, the notion of inconsistency 
need not carry the stigma associated with assertoric case. Issuing inconsistent com- 
mands is irrational-at least if one intends that they be obeyed. But asking inconsis- 
tent questions is not. And, in any case, this seems to be, as noted, the wrong model 
for Blackburn’s purposes. Evaluation, as he seems to conceive it, is not a mode of 
illocutionary force.*’ 
Neither account, then, seems to cope entirely happily with the modus ponens 
inference. Dummett’s account fails to reflect the normativity of the conditional prem- 
ise; Blackburn’s fails to respect the powerful prejudice that the failing of one who 
accepted the premises but repudiated the conclusion would not be merely moral. But 
there is, to my mind, a deeper cause for dissatisfaction with both approaches. What 
they have in common is that they see the presence of a certain kind of vocabulary - 
that of moral or aesthetic evaluation, for instance, or that of logical necessity and 
modality in general-as marking the performance of a certain kind of speech act, 
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distinct from assertion (at least when the latter is properly regarded as the purported 
depiction of truth). It does not matter, now, whether the speech act in question is 
strictly a mode of illocutionary force or whether it is something else. In neither case 
are the materials at hand, it seems, for an explanation of the role of iterated applica- 
tions of the vocabulary in question.21 So neither proposal promises any sort of satis- 
factory account of the kind of applications that we seem, intelligibly enough, to be 
able to make of notions like logical necessity and logical possibility to statements 
in which such modal notions are themselves the principal operators. Such applica- 
tions may not be very important in ordinary inferential contexts; but they are tremen- 
dously important in modal logic, and they are, it should be stressed, apparently intel- 
ligible. If, in contrast, affirming ‘necessarily P’ is some kind of projection from my 
inability to imagine the opposite, or marks the adoption of P as some kind of linguis- 
tic rule, or expresses my resolve to count nothing as falsification of P-or whatever 
the preferred expressive account is-no space seems to have been Iefi for a construal 
of ‘necessarily: necessarily P’. 
Blackburn himself is strongly committed to the progressive character of the 
projectivist/quasi-realist research program with respect to modal idiom,22 but the 
point is not (merely) ad hominem. It is that modality undoubtedly raises the same 
kinds of problems, in this context, 2s does morality. There is the same kind of 
difficulty in seeing ourjudgments, modal or moral, as responses to objective features 
of the world. In both cases, we feel the want of a satisfactory account of the con- 
fidence that, on occasion anyway, we repose in such judgments; in both cases, phil- 
osophers have been tempted to invoke special cognitive faculties, sensitive to states 
of affairs of the problematic kind, as our ordinary senses are sensitive to many of 
the characteristics of our physical environment. In neither case has any account of 
this kind achieved anything but mystery. This is not to say that an irrealist account 
of either can be satisfactory only if it handles both equally well. But it is to suggest 
that the general form of an irrealist account of morals should at least be a starter in 
the case of modal discourse also. There may, in the end, be good reason for rejecting 
the irrealist account of either or both. But we can hardly suppose that we are enter- 
taining the strongest possible version of such an account until it is fashioned in such 
a way that it can be adapted to any of the areas of discourse about which an irrealist 
(or, more specifically, projectivist) tale may seem worth telling. 
The proper response to the forgoing considerations, it seems to me, is to recog- 
nize that the step in the direction of expressive, or more generally nonassertoric ac- 
counts of those areas of discourse that, for various reasons, have inspired irrealist 
suspicions, is a faux pas. The irrealist should seek not to explain away the assertoric 
appearance, but to sever the connection between assertion and the realism, which 
he wishes to oppose. This direction has been largely passed over, no doubt, because 
of the intimate connection between assertion and truth: To assert a statement is to 
present it as true. So if moral, or modal judgments rank as assertions. we are bound 
to countenance, it seems, some notion of moral, or modal truth. If this seems a fatal 
step from a would-be irrealist point of view, it can only be because it is being as- 
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sumed that where there is truth at all, realism is correct. But that is an error. Realism, 
even when characterized as impressionistically as above, evidently intends a concep- 
tion of truth that should be understood along the line traditionally favored by ‘cor- 
respondence’ theorists. What else could be the point of the play with the idea of an 
‘independent’ reality, one that ‘confers’ truth-values independently of our judgments? 
By contrast, it has yet to be understood why the notion of truth, which essentially 
engages with that of assertion, may not be the thinnest possible, merely ‘disquota- 
tional’ notion. 
To assert a statement is to present it as true, but there need be no supposition 
that the notion of truth is uniform across all regions of assertoric discourse. The 
proper focus for the dispute between realist and irrealist tendencies in moral philoso- 
phy, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mathematics. and elsewhere is on 
the notion of truth appropriate to these various kinds of statements. Actually, this 
is the conclusion to which Blackburn’s quasi-realist program must, if successful, 
lead. The goal of the quasi-realist is to explain how all the features of some 
problematic region of discourse that might inspire a realist construal of it can be har- 
monized with objectivism. But if this program succeeds, and provides inter alia-as 
Blackburn himself anticipates -an account of what appear to be ascriptions of truth 
and falsity to statements in the regioii, then we shall wind up- running the connec- 
tion between truth and assertion in the opposite direction-with a rehabilitation of 
the notion that such statements rank as assertions, with truth-conditions, after all. 
Blackburn’s quasi-realist thus confronts a rather obvious dilemma. Either his pro- 
gram fails-in which case he does not, after all, explain how the projectivism that 
inspires it can satisfactorily account for the linguistic practices in question-or it suc- 
ceeds, in which case it makes good all the things the projectivist started out wanting 
to deny: that the discourse in question is genuinely assertoric, aimed at truth, and 
so on. The dilemma is fatal unless what the projectivist originally wanted to maintain 
is actually consistent with the admission that the statements in question are, indeed, 
assertions, apt to be true or false in the sense, but only in the sense, that the quasi- 
realist explains. But if that is right, then the route through the idea that such state- 
ments are not genuinely assertoric but are ‘expressive’, or, one way or another, con- 
stitute some other kind of speech-act, emerges as ;L detour. Working with that idea, 
and pursuit of the quasi-realist program on its basis, may help us to focus on the no- 
tion of truth that is appropriate to the statements in question. But once that focus is 
achieved, we have to drop the idea-and it hardly seems credible that only by this 
somewhat circuitous route can the requisite focus be gained.2’ 
Iv 
Naturally, it is questionable whether the notion of truth can, indeed, be divided up 
in the manner that the foregoing considerations anticipate, and also, if it can, 
whether reasonably definite criteria can emerge for determining which notion is ap- 
plicable within which areas of discourse. And correspondence accounts, should they 
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prove to be the stuff of realism, have their familiar  problem^.'^ But, still, I think 
there is a program here, and that the beginnings of some germane distinctions can 
be sketched. 
How ‘thin’ can something worth regarding as a notion of truth be? We do not 
have a truth predicate if we merely have a device of ‘disquotation’, since such a de- 
vice could as well be applied to utterances that are not assertions. And, it may seem, 
it will hardly do to say that a predicate that functions disquotationally just for asser- 
tions is a truth predicate; that account, if it is not to be circular, will require us to 
separate assertions from speech acts of other kinds without appeal to the notion of 
truth, an unpromising project. Actually, I believe the commitment to avoid circular- 
ity of this kind would be an impossible burden in the quest for an account of truth. 
But, in any case, one essential aspect omitted by a bare disquotational account of 
truth is normativiry: Truth is what assertions aim for. Now, if aiming at truth is to 
supply a substantial constraint on assertoric practice, an assertion’s being true cannot 
be guaranteed simply by the assertor’s taking it to be true. A constraint is substantial 
only if we can make sense of the idea of a misapprehension about whether or not 
it is satisfied, or of its being satisfied independently of any particular subject’s opin- 
ion about the matter. The normativity of truth is respected by an assertoric practice 
only if a role is provided within that practice for the notions of ignorance, error, and 
improved assessment. 
This, I think, is the least that must be asked. Nor is it very much. What is called 
for is only some sort of notion of a proper pedigree for an assertion, and correspond- 
ingly proper grounds for criticism of assertions. We do, indeed, practice these dis- 
tinctions in all the areas of discourse about which philosophers have been drawn to 
an irrealistic point of view. Even the sort of affective judgments-concerning what 
is funny, or revolting, and so on-about which almost everybody’s antecedent preju- 
dice is irrealist are allowed to be capable of being better and worse made. Judgments 
about what is funny, for instance, may be in bad taste, or idiosyncratic, or insincere, 
or just plain wrong. (There is nothing funny about what happened at Chernobyl.) 
There is a connection, here, with Geach’s point. We should have, in general, 
no use for conditional or disjunctive compounds of such judgments unless it was 
sometimes possible to appraise the truth-values of the compounds independently of 
any knowledge of those of their constituents. Otherwise, knowledge of such a com- 
pound could never be of any practical inferential use, and its assertion would always 
violate Gricean ‘co-operative’ constraints. It is, thus, a condition of practically signi- 
ficant embedding of the kind Geach focused on that ignorance be possible concerning 
the status of the embedded statements. And ignorance is possible only if there is, 
indeed, a contrast in content between the claim that P is true and the claim that any 
particular subject assents to P-the contrast that, I have just suggested, is prerequi- 
site for paying proper heed to the normativity of truth. 
It appears, then-if I am permitted a somewhat swift conclusion-that truth, 
assertion, ignorance, error, and significant embedding constitute a package deal. We 
get all of them off the ground together, or none of them. And the real significance 
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of Geach’s antiexpressivist point is that they are ‘off the ground‘ in all the familiar 
cases where expressivists wanted to look away from the notion of assertion and to 
characterize practices in other terms. The question, then, is: What can, nevertheless, 
be missing? What may a region of discourse lack, even when it has all this, which 
may inspire doubts about its factuality? 
The answer, in one unhelpful word, is ”objectivity.” I think that a number of 
separable ideas jostle each other here, and I have space only to advert to three of 
the more important. The first has to do with what I shall call the rurional command 
of truth. The second concerns the distinction between (human) responses that, 
respectively, are and are not properly regarded i s  cognirive. The third I shall touch 
on at the end of this paper, 
By the ‘rational command’ of truth, I mean the idea that truth commands the 
assent of any subject who has an appropriate cognitive endowment and uses it ap- 
propriately. Associated with this is the notion that belief is not an operation of the 
will. We do not choose our beliefs, but come to them involuntarily-though not 
necessarily, of course, as a result of involuntary processes- by putting ourselves at 
the mercy, so to speak, of our reason, our senses, any other ‘cognitive receptors’ we 
may have, and the external world. Truth, then, according to this feature of the con- 
cept, is what is at the origin of the be!iefs we form when we function as, cognitively, 
we ought. 
In describing this as part of our ‘concept’ of truth, I mean only that it is a feature 
of the way we ordinarily think about truth. One of the oldest philosophical lessons 
is that there are other, potentially destructive elements within the notion- elements 
that traditional skeptical arguments exploit -that threaten to reduce the correspon- 
dence, if any, between what is true and the deliverances of our better cognitive na- 
tures to inscrutable contingency. Even prescinding from skepticism, realists in the 
sense of Dummett will want to insist that we can understand, for at least a significant 
number of kinds of statements, how their truth might altogether fail to connect with 
any disposition on our part to believe them, no matter how meticulous and extensive 
our investigation. And, in the other direction, everyone must acknowledge that what 
we are induced to believe by meticulous and extensive investigation may still not be 
the truth in any examples where no such finite investigation can encompass all the 
material, as it were, in which evidence of untruth might be found. Explicitly unres- 
tricted, contingent generalizations, and any statement that -like many ascriptions of 
dispositions - implicitly contains such a generality, are the obvious instances. 
One response, which would continue to allot a dominant role to the aspect of 
rational command, would be to move in the direction of a Peircean conception of 
truth: We can mean by ’truth’ only that which is fated to be agreed on by all who 
pursue rational enquiry sufficiently far, a “final opinion . . . independent not in- 
deed of thought in general, but of all that is arbitrary and individual in th~ught.”’~ 
Such a conception dismisses the total or partial epistemological absolutism involved 
in skepticism and in Dummettian realism. And it relaxes the sense in which the truth 
of an unrestricted generalization must command the assent of a rational investigator: 
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A well-founded investigation may, indeed, mislead, but if such a generalization is 
true, all rational investigators will, sooner or later, come justifiably to believe that 
it is. 
This has been an influential construal of the notion of truth. But, insofar as 
some sort of preconception about the failure of certain statements to exemplify ratio- 
nal command is at work in the motivation for some kinds of irrealism, it is questiona- 
ble whether the Peircean construct gets it quite right. For one thing, it very much 
is a philosophers' construct, building on but going a good way past anything that 
might plausibly be regarded as our intuitive understanding of truth. For another, the 
thought that only Peircean truths are true in the substantial sense we seek may seem 
to hold out too many hostages to fortune. If, for instance, Quine's famous thesis of 
the underdetermination of scientific theory by empirical data is true (fated to be 
agreed by all rational investigators?), then it seems that the hypotheses of such the- 
ories cannot pass the Peircean test. That would be too swift a resolution of the debate 
about scientific realism. Worse, any statement whose conditions of justifiable assent 
are a function of what else a subject believes are at risk in the same way. If whether 
you ought to believe a particular statement depends on what you already believe, 
Peircean convergence could be expected only among rational investigators who set 
out with the same baggage, as it were. And it has yet to be explained why their ration- 
ality alone should tend to ensure that that is so. Yet, almost all our contingent beliefs 
appear to be in this situation. 
A Peircean can reply. The possibility adverted to is the possibility that there 
may be rationally incommensurable alternative systems of belief. If that is so, we 
can either retain the idea that one such system might contain the truth at the expense 
of the others, or we can drop the idea. To retain it is to render the connection between 
truth and rational enquiry utterly fortuitous. To drop it is to abandon or to relativize 
the notion of an accurate representation of the world. In neither case is room left 
for the idea that the truth is what commands the assent of an appropriately cogni- 
tively endowed, rational investigator. So the Peircean development of the notion of 
rational command should not be faulted on the ground that it cannot accommodate 
the possible consequences of the underdetermination thesis or of justificational 
holism. The fact is that whatever notion of truth survives for statements that fall prey 
to those consequences simply cannot have the feature of rational command. My own 
opinion is that not very much of what we are pleased to regard as factual discourse 
will actually fall prey to those consequences. In particular, a holistic conception of 
confirmation poses a global threat only if, at some level, the selection of background 
beliefs is unconstrained. There is no reason to suppose that this must be so, but the 
matter raises very large issues, which I shall not attempt to broach here. 
Even so, I think the intuition of rational command should be explained along 
other than Peircean lines. For it is an intuition that coexists with our inclination 
(however unfortunate) to allow that truth may be evidence-transcendent. So, the in- 
tuitive point is not that what is true ultimately commands the assent of the rational. 
It is, I suggest, that what it is correct to think about any statement that is apt to be, 
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in the appropriately substantial sense, true or false is something about which rational 
investigators have no option at any given stage of investigation. It is, more speci- 
fically, determinate of any given body of evidence whether it supports such a state- 
ment, or supports its negation, or neither. Even that is too simple. Vague statements, 
for instance, may nevertheless be factual. But their vagueness consists precisely in 
the existence of a range of cases where rational subjects may permissibly and irredu- 
cibly disagree about their statlls in point of justification. A similar point applies to 
statements, vague or not, for which the evidence is probabilistic. Different subjects 
may, without putting their rationality in jeopardy, have different probability thres- 
holds, so to speak. One may require a higher probability than another before being 
prepared to work on the expectation that a hypothesis is true. But, so far as I can 
see, only in these two respects is qualification necessary. If a pair of subjects dis- 
agree about the credibility of a particular statement, and if the explanation of the dis- 
agreement concerns neither of the qualifications just noted, then either they are oper- 
ating on the basis of different pools of evidence-states of information-or one 
(perhaps both) is misrating the evidence they share. If the states of information are 
different, and neither is misrating the state of information, then one state must be 
superior to the other: Either it must contain bona fide data that the other lacks, or 
it must omit spurious data that the oher contains. Accordingly, we may lay down 
the following as a criterion for the inclusion of a statement, or range of statements 
within the category of those apt to be true in the substantial sense-the sense which 
incorporates the aspects of rational command: Disagreements about the status of 
such statements, where not attributable to vagueness or permissibly differing proba- 
bility thresholds, can be explained only if fault is found with one of the protagonist’s 
assessment of his or her data, or with the data being assessed. The data must be in 
some way faulty or incomplete, or, if not, they must have suffered a prejudiced re- 
sponse. 
It follows that reason to think that other kinds of explanation of disagreement 
are possible is reason to think that the statements disagreed about are not objective 
in the relevant sense, and so not apt to be substantially true or false. This is one of 
the primary motives that have fueled expressive theories. It is surely, for instance, 
the mainspring of the thought that judgments about what is funny are not genuinely 
factual: None of the envisaged explanations may be appropriate in the case of a dis- 
agreement about humor- it may be, as we say, that the subjects have different ‘senses 
of humor’. It is for the same reason that importance is attached, in the debates about 
moral and aesthetic realism, to the (much exaggerated) cultural variability of moral 
standards and the often idiosyncratic character of standards of aesthetic excellence. 
It is another question, though, how one would actually set about showing that 
a given region of discourse failed to pass the test. A model dispute must be con- 
structed whose explanation falls within none of the alternatives noted: It is not, that 
is to say, to be owing to vagueness in the statement(s) disputed about, nor to permis- 
sibly different probability thresholds, nor to faulty data- including inferential or ob- 
servational error - nor to one of the subject’s possession of a relatively inferior state 
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of information, nor to a prejudiced assessment of agreed data.26 But the question is, 
of course, what, for these purposes, counts as ‘a state of information’ or ‘data’? What 
will tend to happen when this construction is attempted for a particular problematic 
class of statements-about humor, or value, or logical necessity, for instance-is 
that it will be relatively easy to construct a dispute that fits the bill, provided the ‘data’ 
are restricted to statements of other kinds whose factuality is not at issue. It is often 
possible, for instance, to give reasons for or against the judgment that some situation 
is funny, but, as just remarked, it seems perfectly conceivable that a pair of subjects 
may have an irreducible disagreement about such a judgment, although neither is 
under any misapprehension about any pertinent fadts, or knows more than the other, 
or is somehow prejudicially over- or under-rating the facts that they agree about. 
But this way of describing the matter explicitly takes it that the ‘facts’ exclude 
whether or not the situation in question is funny. A similar possibility obtains in the 
case of logical ne~essity.~’ And it does not seem unlikely that moral evaluations, for 
instance, are in a like situation, although I shall not pause here to consider the con- 
struction of an appropriate dispute. 
In any such case, it is open to the realist to accept the proposed criterion but 
to insist that the germane data may not legitimately be taken to exclude facts of the 
very species that the problematic of shtements serve to record. The comic realist,28 
for instance, may accommodate the model dispute that opponent constructs by insist- 
ing that misappraisal of the data must, indeed, be at the root of it; it is just that 
the data misappraised may irreducibly concern the humor, or lack of it, in the sit- 
uation. 
The structure of this maneuver is not unreasonable. Plainly, it cannot always 
be the case that, for any particular class of statements whose factuality is not dis- 
puted, they would pass the test even if we restricted our attention to ‘data’ that ex- 
cluded them; not all genuinely factual disagreements have to be owing to mistakes, 
or ignorance, or prejudice about other matters. But the upshot is not that the pro- 
posed test is useless, but merely that it has a part to play only in the first stage of 
a dialectic, which must now be pressed further. The test connects failure to agree 
about judgments that are apt to be substantially true or false with failure of ideal cog- 
nitivepet$ormance. Accordingly, the realist who responds in the way described now 
owes something by way of explanation of what ideal cognitive performance might 
be with respect to the sui generis states of affairs to which, as such a realist now con- 
tends, our judgments of humor, or value, or modality, or whatever, are responsive. 
We require to be told how it is possible for us to be in touch with states of affairs 
of the relevant kind. What is it about them, and about us, that makes them-at least 
ideally-accessible to us? It is no answer, of course, merely to introduce a word or 
phrase for some putative kind of special cognitive faculty-‘the sense of humor’, 
‘conscience’, ‘the reason’-that is to play the appropriate part. It is true that some of 
our judgments must be, so to speak, primitively factual, from the point of view of 
the test. But that is not to say that we have carte blanche to regard in this way any 
class ofjudgments that would otherwise fail the test. Where there is cognition, there 
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must be at least the possibility of a satisfactory theoretical account of how it is ac- 
complished. 
The first preconception about a substantial notion of truth was its possession 
of the feature of rational command. Now we have, in effect, arrived at the second: 
Statements are apt to be substantially true or false only if it is possible to provide 
a satisfactory account of the kind of cognitive powers that a mind would have to have 
in order to be in touch with the states of affairs that they purportedly de~cribe.’~ But 
what should ‘a satisfactory account’ mean here? I take it that it would not be necessary 
to trouble ourselves with the question if it could be shown that the judgments that 
the realist wishes to take as expressive of speciaf abilities could actually be satisfac- 
torily simulated, without collusion, by a subject who had only cognitive powers that 
both the realist and his irrealist opponent are agreed about. Thus, if, for instance, 
assertibility conditions could be laid down for judgments of logical necessity that 
someone could recognize to obtain, whose cognitive faculties embraced only the ca- 
pacity for empirical judgments and so excluded anything sensitive to logical neces- 
sity as such, it would be, on the face of it, simply a bad explanation of our handling 
of such judgments to view it as expressive of anything additional. Fucultutes non 
jingendae sum praeter necessitatem. 30 
The irrealist, however, may n3t easily be able to make out such a case. This 
will be the situation when the ability to make acceptable, or at any rate, sincere and 
apparently well-understood, judgments of the kind in question will depend on the 
subject’s capacity to be uflected in some distinctive way: to be amused, for instance, 
or revolted. If possessing such affective capacities is a necessary condition of full 
competence with the judgments in question, the irrealist’s question has to be, rather, 
why see such affection as cognition? And the thought is, of course, that no ‘satisfac- 
tory account’ either of the affective response itself or of its causes can be given that 
will legitimate the realist’s view. Contrast the sort of story that can be told about our 
perceptual knowledge of our immediate environment. Our theories of the nature of 
matter and of the workings of our sense organs and brains are hardly complete. But 
we know enough to tell an elaborate story about my perception of the telephone on 
my desk-about the kind of object it is, and the kind of creature I am, and about why, 
accordingly, I am able to be aware of its being there in the way in which I am. How- 
ever, we have not the slightest idea how to extend this prototype to the cases of value 
or humor or logical necessity. And, though that is so, it is perfectly idle to claim 
that, in our judgments of these various kinds, we express cognitive responses to ob- 
jective states of affairs. 
The likely realist reply will be to suggest that the kind of explanatory model 
invoked is question-begging. In insisting that the epistemology of a certain putative 
range of states of affairs ultimately be accounted for in terms of existing fields of 
natural science, the irrealist loads the dice in favor of a naturalistic ontology. The 
states of affairs that pass the test implicitly imposed can only be those to which natu- 
ral science assigns a causal role. Accordingly, as before, it is open to the realist to 
claim that the suggested criterion- that a class of judgments is apt to be substantially 
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true or false only if a satisfactory account of the (ideal) epistemology can be given- 
is in itself acceptable, but that it is being applied here in a tendentiously restricted 
way. The moral realist can urge, for instance, that just as the ‘data’ that figured in 
the statement of the first criterion should be allowed to include moral data, so a ‘satis- 
factory account’, as the notion figures in the second criterion, should be allowed to 
proceed by reference to a framework that includes not only natural science, but also, 
inter alia, moral judgment. 
Does this help? Well, it might be supposed that once moral judgments them- 
selves are allowed to be explanatorily primitive, the account of our cognition of the 
truth of some particular moral judgment may straightforwardly proceed by inducing 
the kinds of consideration that incline us to that particular judgment, namely, a moral 
argument based on both moral and nonmoral premises. This, though, will hardly do. 
Such a model explanation of moral ‘knowledge’ would no doubt overestimate the ex- 
tent to which our convictions on particular questions are principled, and would be 
inapplicable, besides, to at least some of the moral premises that applications of it 
would be likely to involve. But what is most basically wrong is that no real analogy 
is constructed with the perceptual case. It is not to our knowledge of neurophysiology 
and physics, for instance, that the explanation of my capacity to perceive the tele- 
phone would appeal, but to relevant hypotheses within those disciplines themselves. 
By contrast, the kind of ‘explanation’ of our moral knowledge, just canvassed ex- 
plicitly, does appeal, not to certain moral premises, but to our knowledge of them. 
So it cannot provide what was being requested: an explanation of what it is about 
us, and about the moral realm, that makes for the possibility of cognitive relations 
at all. 
In general, then, though it would be, I think, a fair complaint by an evaluative 
realist, for instance, that the original, explicitly naturalistic version of the second test 
is unfairly loaded, the prospects for the position do not seem to become much 
brighter if we grant, for the sake of argument, that moral theory be permitted to 
figure in the explananr. Indeed, prescinding from the confusion just discussed, it is 
unclear what, for these purposes, moral ‘theory’ might be taken to be, and how it 
might be exploited by a more liberal style of explanation. Matters look hardly more 
promising for modal and comic realism, but I cannot attempt a more detailed ap- 
praisal here. 
V 
Blackburn writes: 
Suppose we say that weproject an attitude or habit or other commitment which 
is not descriptive on to the world, when we speak and think as though there 
were a property of things which our sayings describe, which we can reason 
about, be wrong about, and so on. Projecting is what Hume refers to when he 
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talks of ”gilding and staining all natural objects with the colours borrowed 
from internal sentiment”, or of the mind ”spreading itself on the world.”” 
I have spoken more often of ‘irrealism’ than of ‘projectivism’. The latter, it seems, 
is best reserved for those species of irrealism that concern commitments - to borrow 
Blackburn’s term - founded on some specific mode of ‘internal sentiment’ or affective 
phenomenology. The root projectivist notion is the Humean one that we have a ten- 
dency to seem to ourselves to find in the world qualities that, properly, are predicated 
of our responses to it; more specifically, that the range of our responses that we tend 
to talk about as though they were cognitive, apt to disclose real features of the world, 
is actually much broader than the range of those which really deserve to be so 
regarded. Projectivism is, thus, a possible and natural form for the irrealist cause 
to assume in the three areas-morality, modality, and humor-that this discussion 
has mainly had in view.32 Irrealism about scientific theory, by contrast, is not, in 
any version worthy of attention, projectivist. The most powerful arguments against 
scientific realism concern not whether any appropriately local response we have to 
scientific theory is cognitive- there is no such local response-but whether theoreti- 
cal statements can survive the first of the two tests adumbrated: Must disagreements 
about scientific theory, insofar as tkey are not attributable to vagueness in the con- 
cepts involved, or to rationally permissible variations in standards of evidence, in- 
variably be explicable in terms of prejudiced assessment of agreed data, or faulty 
data, or ignorance? Not if the underdetermination thesis is accepted. And not, per- 
haps, if the received wisdom is correct that the acceptability of any report of observa- 
tion is invariably theoretically conditioned. For, then, the acceptability of any pool 
of data comes to depend on one’s background theory. And that means that the data 
can exhibit the feature of rational command only if the ingredients in the background 
theories do. How is that to be provided for, if any data by which such theories might, 
in turn, be assessed will be theoretically conditioned in the same ~ense?~’  
In Blackburn’s hands, as we have seen, projectivism starts out as an ‘expres- 
sive’ or nonassertoric thesis. I have suggested that this element of the view should 
be abandoned. The real question concerns what notion of truth is applicable to the 
‘projections’. The projectivisthrrealist thesis should be that only the thinnest possible 
notion is appropriate; we have seen, by contrast, two ways in which the notion of 
truth applicable to a class of commitments might, on the contrary, be ‘thick‘. I shall 
conclude by noting a potential instability in the projectivist position, and a third 
potentially germane distinction on the thinness/thickness scale. 
The instability afflicts, paradoxically, just those cases where the projectivist 
line is intuitively most appealing. These are the classes of commitment that, like 
judgments about what is funny, seem to be most intimately associated with a well- 
defined kind of response, which we are already inclined to regard as affective rather 
than detective. The problem is that any such response can be construed as potentially 
detective-can be ‘cognitivized‘, as it were-if the relevant projected ‘quality’ will 
44 CRISPIN WRIGHT 
sustain construal as a disposition. Suppose, for instance, that some such bicondi- 
tional as this holds: 
X is funny iff X is disposed to amuse many/most/normal people in 
many/most/normal circumstances. 
There is, obviously, scope for consideration about which version of such a bicondi- 
tional might be most plausible, about whether some reference to right-mindedness, 
or the like, might be wanted, and so on. But if any such biconditional construal pro- 
vides the resources for a reasonably accurate descriptive account of the relevant 
parts of our linguistic practice, there can be no objection to the idea that judgments 
of humor do have the substantial truth-conditions that the biconditional describes. 
And the relevant response-being amused- will take on cognitive status only insofar 
as finding oneself so affected will constitute a defeasible ground for the assertion that 
the right-hand side of the biconditional is realized. 
A defensible form of projectivism, then, in making good the claim that a cer- 
tain class of judgments is based on a response that is better not regarded as cognitive, 
has to interpose sufficient distance, as it were, between the judgments and the re- 
sponse to prevent a dispositional construal. And this will be possible only to the ex- 
tent that the original projectivist image-that we make such judgments merely by 
way of reading back into the world features that properly belong to our response to 
it-is strictly misplaced. Projectivism has, therefore, a delicate balancing act to per- 
form. If it stays too close to the image, it is liable to be undermined by a dispositional 
construal; if it departs too far from it, it may become unclear in what sense the re- 
sponse in question provides the basis for the relevant class of judgments, and why 
an argument for an irrealist view of those judgments may properly proceed from the 
noncognitive character of the response. The difficulty is well illustrated, I think, by 
the case of moral judgments. It is prima facie very implausible to construe moral 
qualities as dispositions to produce moral sentiments -not least because the ascrip- 
tion of such a disposition does not seem to have the reason-giving force that properly 
belongs to a moral judgment.34 But just for that reason, the belief that moral passion 
is not properly viewed as a state of cognition seems to have no very direct connection 
with moral irrealism. 
Consider, finally, a case where such a dispositional analysis seems appropriate 
anyway: the case of secondary qualities.’’ To be red, for instance, consists in being 
disposed to induce a certain kind of visual experience in the normally sighted, under 
normal circumstances. (I prescind from the considerations to do with trans-galactic 
Doppler effect, and so on.) So, we have a biconditional comparable to those mooted 
for ‘funny’ above: 
X is red iff X would be seen as red by normally functioning observers in nor- 
mal circumstances. 
Now, there is a question about how ‘normality’ is to be understood for the purposes 
of the biconditional. Suppose we understand it statistically: Normally functioning 
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observers function like most of us actually do most of the time; normal circum- 
stances are relevantly similar to those which actually prevail most of the time. So 
understood, the statement on the right-hand side of the biconditional would still 
qualify as apt for substantial truth by both the tests earlier considered. Disagreement 
about such a statement might well be owing to vagueness in its constituent concepts, 
or to personal probability thresholds - the disputants might, for example, each have 
used statistical sampling techniques. But it seems impossible to understand how 
there could be a disagreement that could not be explained along those lines and yet 
owe nothing to prejudice, ignorance, or misinformation. As for the second test, the 
sort of direction that an account of the ideal epistemology of such a judgment should 
take is, prima facie at least, clear. Nevertheless, to interpret the relevant notion of 
normality in this way is to impose a certain kind of reading on the biconditional-at 
least if it is held to be true a priori. In effect, we give priority to the right-hand side. 
What makes something red is how we, most of us, respond to it in the conditions 
that usually obtain. 
It is possible to elicit a third and stronger respect in which the notion of truth 
may be substantial if we contrast with this right-to-left reading of such a bicondi- 
tional an interpretation that assigns priority, instead, to the left-hand side. Such an 
interpretation would see redness as a property of things in themselves, connekting 
at best contingently with any effect induced in us under statistically normal circum- 
stances. Accordingly, to give priority to the left-hand side of the biconditional, while 
retaining its a priori status, would be to impose a different interpretation on the nor- 
mality provisos. The essential characteristic of a normally functioning observer will 
now be: one suffering from no internal impediment to the proper functioning of the 
capacity to defect red. And normal circumstances will be those in which there is no 
external impediment to the proper functioning of this same capacity. 
I owe to Mark Johnston the suggestion of the possibility of these alternative 
readings of such biconditionals; he characterized them as ‘projective’ and ‘detective’ 
re~pectively.’~ I would rather reserve ‘projective’ and ‘projectivism’ in the way I have 
indicated. The distinction, if it can be properly elucidated, is nevertheless very im- 
portant and does correspond, it seems to me, to a further aspect of our intuitive 
preconceptions about factuality and substantial truth. An interesting suggestion, 
which I suspect is not quite right, is that it also corresponds to the distinction between 
secondary and primary qualities. Primary qualities will sustain biconditionals for 
which the proper reading is detective; the biconditionals appropriate to secondary 
qualities, by contrast, will be properly read from right to left. However that may 
be, there is a distinction here-roughly, between our responses making if m e  that 
so-and-so is the case and their merely rejecting that truth-that the contrast between 
two ways of reading an appropriate biconditional, interpreted as holding a priori, 
seems to capture nicely. And this, as noted, is a distinction that comes into play for 
judgments that pass the tests earlier considered and are accordingly apt for truth in 
more than the thinnest sense. Of any such class of judgments, we can ask whether 
an appropriate biconditional does, indeed, hold a priori and, if so, to which side be- 
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longs the priority. If the way I introduced thedistinction is appropriate, this is a ques- 
tion to be decided by reflection on the proper interpretation of the normality 
provisos. But that is not the onIy possible way of proceeding, and it may prove not 
to be best. I wish merely to suggest the thought that one important class of intuitions 
about objectivity-those reflected, in particular, in the attempt to draw a distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities-have no proper place in the disputes be- 
tween realism and irrealism. Rather, when the dialectic is set up in the way I have 
suggested it should be, they are internal to realism.37p 38 
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